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i. SHiFTinG LeADeRSHiP AnD PRioRiTieS
Last year, we celebrated the recent confirmation of Daniel Gordon as the new Administrator of 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), bemoaned the Congressional delay of Martha John-
son’s confirmation as the administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA), and could only 
speculate whether (and from where) some discernable direction might arise in terms of the admin-
istration’s acquisition reform agenda. See also Steven L. Schooner, Federal Contracting and Acquisi-
tion: Progress, Challenges, and the Road Ahead, Chapter in Framing a Public management research 
agenda (IBM Business of Government, 2010), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542830. As 
we approach 2011, a different landscape awaits.
This year, the most dramatic source of activity emanated from the Defense Department, primarily 
through USD(AT&L) Ashton Carter’s Efficiency and Productivity Initiative. Aviation Week recently reported 
that: “Ashton Carter plans to resign his tenured position at Harvard University and continue his work as 
procurement czar at the Pentagon ‘as long as the president and the secretary of defense want me to keep 
doing what I’m doing[.]’ … [That’s significant because most observers agree that] the Pentagon’s efficiency 
initiative — a drive to conduct business leaner and slow the growth of the defense budget — is unlikely 
to succeed without the teamwork of Carter and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.” More on this below.
Meanwhile, OFPP remained busy – impressively so, given its tiny staff. In addition to a host of 
challenges (demonstrating acquisition savings, rebalancing the federal/contractor workforce, and re-
imagining the organizational conflict of interest regime), for the first time in decades, the administra-
tion appears committed to investing in the acquisition workforce. See, e.g., http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/procurement and http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_index_other/topics. And a 
late-breaking topic to watch appears to be the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) initiative to 
reinvent the government’s approach to the acquisition and management of its information technology (IT).
We remain unconvinced – and we attempt not to be distracted by – the dramatic rhetoric promising 
savings just waiting to be found in the acquisition system; nor do we believe that the system is capable 
of generating credible data demonstrating or validating the promised results. See, e.g., Peter Orszag, 
Cutting Waste and Saving Money Through Contracting Reform (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/07/07/Cutting-Waste-and-Saving-Money-Through-Contracting-Reform. 
“In March 2009, the President directed agencies to save $40 billion annually by [FY] 2011 through con-
tracting and to reduce the use of high-risk contracts. Last December, OMB reported on agency plans to 
save $19 billion in FY 2010, and agencies are on track to meet that savings goal as well as the larger one 
for 2011.” (Emphasis added.) See also, July 15, 2010 Testimony of OFPP Administrator Daniel I. Gordon 
(“There is much work ahead, but early results show that we are on track in our efforts to achieve sav-
ings and reduce contracting risk.”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
legislative/testimony/ofpp/Gordon_testimony_715.pdf; OMB Reports on Contracting Reform Successes, 
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52 GC ¶ 237. Rather, we continue to believe that real savings – as opposed 
to insignificant, symbolic gestures – will occur when the government curbs 
its appetite for spending. Reducing requirements – buying less goods and 
services – will generate savings. And only time will tell whether Congress 
and the agencies are serious about doing less, jettisoning programs, and 
eliminating existing mandates. 
ii. SPenDinG: PLATeAU oR DoWnWARD TRenD? An enD 
To THe PoST-MiLLeniUM PRoCUReMenT SPenDinG 
BinGe?
A. oK, it’s Still A Lot of Money. Throughout the past decade, we 
continued to be surprised by the increased volume and rate of federal 
procurement spending. Using adjusted figures (yes, between FPDS and 
USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears 
that the annual increases in federal procurement – from 2001 through 
2008 – were never less than three times the rate of inflation. The experts 
swore that the growth would taper, and, in 2009, the growth rate did slow 
and, apparently, finally, stall. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings that 
the current spending binge was a blip – and that procurement spending 
would promptly retract – were unfounded. 
 Now there seems to be greater consensus and empirical evidence that 
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the 
news is not all bad for contractors in that – at least for now – the plateau 
represents the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve. 
Federal Procurement Spending 2001–2010*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement  
Spending (in Billions 
of Dollars)
Percentage Increase  
or (Decrease) From  
Previous Year
Percentage Increase or 
(Decrease) in Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)
2010 $534.5* (~1) 0.1*
2009 $540.4 (~0) (0.4)
2008 $541.3 13.9 3.8
2007 $475.0 10.5 2.8
2006 $429.8 9.8 3.2
2005 $391.2 13.1 3.4
2004 $345.8 8.8 2.7
2003 $317.7 20.6 2.3
2002 $263.4 18.0 1.6
2001 $223.1
*FY 2010 reflects preliminary reporting.
See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual 
Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2010. 
B. Big Business, Major Players. Looking behind the data, the concen-
tration of spending amongst the largest contracting agencies and govern-
ment contractors remains significant. For example, for fiscal year 2009:
•	 The	Defense	Department	accounted	for	sixty-nine	percent	of	the	
total procurement dollars awarded.
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•	 The	seven	largest	procuring	agencies	(DoD,	Energy,	HHS,	GSA,	
NASA, VA, and DHS) accounted for ninety percent of the total 
dollars awarded.
•	 The	100	largest	federal	contractors	received	more	than	$294	bil-
lion in contracts or more than half of the total dollars awarded.
•	 Conversely,	the	521,036	contract	actions	they	received,	as	a	
group, accounted for less than ten percent of the total actions.
•	 The	top	five	federal	contractors	(Lockheed	Martin,	Boeing,	
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon) received 
more than $112 billion in contracts or more than twenty-one 
percent of the total dollars awarded.
•	 Thirty-four	firms	received	contract	awards	of	more	than	$2	bil-
lion.
•	 Sixty-nine	contractors	were	awarded,	individually,	more	than	$1	
billion in contracts.
C. Data Quality: incremental improvement. Due in large part 
to the introduction of USASpending.gov, the procurement spending 
data to which the public enjoys access continues to improve, but it 
remains far from perfect. Consider, for example, that the government 
still lacks a means for quantifying money actually spent on contracts, 
as opposed to the amount of dollars awarded. While FPDS is far more 
user-friendly (for registered users) and visually pleasing (to casual us-
ers) in its current iteration, it seems less inclined to concatenate and 
publish obvious, significant, macro-level information. For instance, a 
casual user might conclude that, for whatever reason, FPDS appar-
ently has not run or published a Federal Procurement Report since 
Fiscal Year 2007. Still, the greatest concerns lie with data input and 
accuracy, and in that regard, much work remains. See, e.g., IG Faults 
SBA Efforts to Improve FPDS Data Quality, 52 GC ¶ 99; DHS FPDS-
NG Data Incomplete, IG Finds, 52 GC ¶ 70.
D. Grants: The next Frontier. For now, it remains our little secret 
that, despite all of the attention focused upon government contracting, 
over the last decade grant spending outpaced procurement spending by 
more than sixteen percent. Indeed, grant spending exceeded procure-
ment spending for eight of the last ten years. We can only hope that, 
at some point, the oversight and regulatory community shifts its focus 
from procurement to grants. If the government is serious about reduc-
ing its debts and its annual deficits, this seems unavoidable. 
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001–2010*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement Spending  
(in Billions)
Grant Spending  
(in Billions)
2010 $534.5* $553.8*
2009 $540.4 $662.8
2008 $541.3 $418.1
2007 $475.0 $429.6
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2006 $429.8 $489.9
2005 $391.2 $441.6
2004 $345.8 $450.1
2003 $317.7 $493.7
2002 $263.4 $406.3
2001 $223.1 $330.8
*FY 2010 reflects preliminary reporting.
Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
iii. TiMe FoR ReAL CHAnGe? THe DoD eFFiCienCY AnD 
PRoDUCTiViTY inTiATiVe
From our perspective, the most important trends in 2010 emanate from 
the Defense Department’s initiatives to squeeze savings, efficiencies, and 
productivity out of the acquisition regime. The volume and pace of activity 
have been high, and the scope and breadth of the initiatives are broad. See, 
e.g., Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Better 
Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in 
Defense Spending (June 28, 2010) available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/
docs/USD(AT&L)_Memo_to_Acquisition_Professionals_June_28_2010.
pdf. Accompanying slides emphasize the following goals and approaches:
Obtain 2-3% net annual growth in warfighting capabilities 
without identifying and eliminating commensurate budget 
increase by unproductive or low-value-added overhead and 
transfer savings to warfighting capabilities. Do more without 
more.
. . .
Providing Incentives for Greater Efficiency in Industry, including
•	 Leveraging Real Competition
•	 Using Proper Contract Type for Development and 
Procurement
•	 Using Proper Contract Type for Services
•	 Aligning Policy on Profit and Fee to Circumstance
•	 Sharing the Benefits of Cash Flow
•	 Targeting Non-Value-Added Costs
•	 Involving Dynamic Small Business in Defense
•	 Rewarding Excellent Suppliers
Adopting Government Practices that Encourage Efficiency
•	 Adopting “Should-Cost” and “Will-Cost” Management
•	 Strengthening the Acquisition Workforce
•	 Improving Audits
•	 Mandating Affordability as a Requirement
•	 Stabilizing Production Rates
•	 Eliminating Redundancy within Warfighter Portfolios
•	 Establishing Senior Managers for Procurement of Services
•	 Protecting the Technology Base
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The September 14 “Guidance Roadmap” refined the message, packag-
ing twenty-three “principal actions to improve efficiency” into five “major 
areas.” In many ways, particularly the use of italicized first person com-
mentary interspersed throughout the text, the memorandum is unique. 
See Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Better 
Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productiv-
ity in Defense Spending (September 14, 2010), available at http://www.
acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_ 
FINAL.PDF. The Guidance Roadmap slide, http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/
USD_ATL_Guidance_Roadmap_September_14_2010.pdf, repackaged the 
initiative under the following headings:
•	 Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth
•	 Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry
•	 Promote Real Competition
•	 Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition
•	 Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy
The guidance evolved into an implementation directive in early Novem-
ber. See Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military 
Departments (and) Directors of the Defense Agencies, Implementation 
Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Pro-
ductivity in Defense Spending (November 3, 2010), available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD(AT&L)_Implementation_Directive_Better_ 
Buying_Power_110310.pdf. The implementation directive specifies dates 
by which numerous tasks should be accomplished.
A. Sidebar: Major Systems. Last year, we suggested that it was 
premature to conclude that major change has come to the major systems 
acquisition regime despite the good intentions behind the Weapons Sys-
tems Acquisitions Reform Act (WSARA). That opinion is, to some extent, 
fleshed out in the CSIS report, David J. Berteau, et al., Implementation 
of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009: A Progress Report 
(May 26, 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/20100528_
WSARA_Progress_Report.pdf (“Any reliable assessment of whether this 
objective has been achieved – i.e. the spirit of WSARA has been imple-
mented – is going to take at least three to four years, given that cost and 
schedule performance data are lagging indicators and are unlikely to 
provide useful measures of effectiveness in the interim.”) The report cau-
tions that the “emerging challenges for the acquisition system illustrate 
that legislation[, regulation, and policy guidance] are certainly necessary, 
yet they are far from sufficient to fix the defense acquisition system. Ad-
ditional actions remain necessary to ensure better acquisition results in 
the future, including a greater focus on the acquisition workforce as a 
critical enabler and the backbone for successful acquisition outcomes.”
B. The Tanker Procurement: A never-ending Major System 
Acquisition Case Study. We previously noted that the Obama adminis-
tration would inherit one of the hottest potatoes imaginable—the future of 
in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This incredibly important, high-profile 
procurement has attracted (and, frankly, merited) extraordinary attention. 
Last year, we joined the critics who do not understand why DoD or the 
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Air Force refused to fund competitive prototypes and conduct a fly-off. We 
went so far as to suggest that it was worth giving the two major players 
funds to provide two prototypes each – one larger, one smaller. Then, the 
Air Force could deploy the four tankers – for a year or even longer – and 
let the end users weigh in. Ultimately, we would prefer an outcome where 
both pricing and technical performance are based on experience and cus-
tomer satisfaction rather than aspiration. In retrospect – particularly 
to the extent that the contract still has not been awarded – there seems 
little reason why the Air Force did not embrace this approach. This would 
have been at least somewhat consistent with the Navy’s approach with 
the littoral combat ship, where two contracts, each worth slightly more 
than $3.52 billion, including options, call for Lockheed Martin and Aus-
tal USA each to assemble ten coastal warships. Christopher Drew, Navy 
Awards Two Contracts to Build New Combat Ships, nY times (December 
30, 2010); Navy, LCS Design Instability Leaves Dual-Award Strategy on 
Uncertain Course, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 399. See also KC-X Procurement 
Takes Another Turn, 52 GC ¶ 400 (contract award delayed until 2011; 
proprietary information shared with competitors); GAO Denies Protest of 
Air Force Rejection of Late Tanker Proposal, 52 GC ¶ 331.
iV. ACQUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe: FinALLY, SoMe ACTion 
Last year, we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was increas-
ingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and legislation. 
(We apologize here for again attempting to summarize the familiar tale 
that brought us to this point. The federal acquisition workforce declined 
dramatically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in the 
1990’s. We agree with those who assert that the government has not hired 
an appropriate number of new acquisition professionals in any year since 
the 1980’s. Accordingly, a disproportionate share of the existing workforce 
is aging and, in large part, retirement-eligible; most of that workforce 
was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services using flex-
ible contractual vehicles. In addition, as discussed above, the volume of 
purchasing exploded during the last decade. Thus, the government faces 
a problem of enormous proportions.) 
We continue to applaud both the message and the delivery of that 
message by OFPP Administrator Gordon. Most importantly, he has ac-
knowledged the existence of the problem. “The federal government has 
not invested in the acquisition workforce enough to allow it to adequately 
cope with the growth in contract spending or the increased complexity 
of agencies’ missions …. This inattention to the workforce resulted in 
increased use of high-risk contracting practices and insufficient focus on 
contract management, as well as the especially troubling phenomenon of 
agency dependence on contractors to support the acquisition function.” 
At the same time, he has articulated a vision for remedying the situation. 
“The Administration is committed to investing in the growth and develop-
ment of the entire acquisition workforce …. The President’s Budget for FY 
2011 requested $158 million to increase the capability and capacity of the 
civilian agency acquisition workforce, and these funds will improve the 
ability of agencies to hire, train, develop, and retain entry-level as well as 
mid-level acquisition professionals …. OFPP established an annual acqui-
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sition workforce human capital reporting requirement for civilian agencies, 
which should help institutionalize planning for our workforce and tie it 
more closely to mission needs as well as to agencies’ budget processes …. 
[OFPP is] working closely with … the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) to improve the hiring process for contracting professionals [and] 
… conducting outreach to agencies to ensure that existing flexibilities for 
hiring and retaining employees are used, whenever possible.” Testimony 
of Daniel I. Gordon Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting (Sep-
tember 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/legislative/testimony/ofpp/2010-09-16_Gordon-OFPP.pdf.
OFPP Administrator Gordon also scores points for reminding Con-
gress that the government’s problems will not end with a wave of hiring. 
Training and development are equally critical, and impediments remain 
to the government effectively addressing these challenges. See, e.g., Ver-
non J. Edwards, Foundational Training for New Government Contracting 
Officials: An Outline and Suggested Reading, 24 N&CR ¶ 48 (“The surge 
in employment of new contracting personnel and the availability of high 
quality candidates … give federal managers a once-in-a-lifetime chance 
to create a first-class corps of public administrators to run our $500-plus-
billion-a-year acquisition business. But … federal managers must envision 
those officials as being more than administrative/clerical drones sitting 
in cubicles …. They must prepare the new hires … to see their jobs in a 
larger context, so that they can fully understand the roles that they must 
play.”). See also DOD Acquisition Workforce Training Needs Improvement, 
52 GC ¶ 365; DOD Acquisition Workforce Would Benefit From Best-Value 
Training, GAO Says, 52 GC ¶ 365. 
Following Frank Anderson’s retirement in May, DoD announced that 
Katrina McFarland will serve as the President of the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU). Vernon J. Edwards, Feature Comment: Choosing the 
Defense Acquisition University’s New President, 52 GC ¶ 112 (envisioning 
a dramatically different model). The changes in leadership at the Federal 
Acquisition Institute (FAI) have been less transparent. We understand 
that Donna Jenkins remains the Acting Director. 
Agencies have their work cut out for them, however, in funding ad-
ditional acquisition billets and investing in training and professional 
development in an era of pay freezes and pressure to reduce government 
spending. Hopefully, repeating the mantra “return on investment” will sus-
tain the current trend. See generally DOD Civilian Workforce Plan Faces 
Challenges, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 327; EPA Contract and Grant Workforce 
May be Insufficient, IG Reports, 52 GC ¶ 357; OFPP, DPAP Say Federal 
Contracting Is Improving, 52 GC ¶ 239; OMB Acquisition Workforce Plan 
Sets Framework, But Does Not Fulfill Mandate, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 154; 
State Can Better Track CO Training Certifications, IG Says, 52 GC ¶ 105.
V. THe oTHeR PenDULUM: oUTSoURCinG-inSoURCinG
Throughout our careers, pendulums, waves, and cycles have served 
as popular metaphors for the “here we go again” aspects of acquisition 
reform. An oversimplified version of the baby-boomer storyline might 
begin in the mid-to-late 1980’s, an era of robust spending with a series of 
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high-profile defense acquisition problems. (The Ill-Wind investigations and 
prosecutions served as the poster child.) The predictable reaction was a 
period of intense legislation and regulation and, of course, an increase in 
sanctions. (Consider, for example, the 1986 qui tam amendments to the 
False Claims Act and the Procurement Integrity Act.) Staffing of the ac-
quisition functions – both operational and oversight – were at astounding 
levels by today’s standards. By the early 1990’s, however, agency heads 
and end users complained that the acquisition system was unresponsive 
and sought a more business-like approach. The 1990’s procurement re-
forms (again, at a macro-level) sought to reduce regulation and increase 
purchaser flexibility. (Think, e.g., in terms of the FAR Part 15 re-write 
– oral presentations, oh my!!! – and the proliferation of multiple-award, 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts.) Alas, the new millen-
nium brought a spate of bad news stories. (A short list might include the 
Air Force Tanker Lease/Druyun/Boeing debacle, a bottomless grab-bag 
of horror stories prompted by an understaffed acquisition workforce at-
tempting to meet unrealistic expectations in an unforgiving environment 
in Iraq, and any number of post-Katrina clean-up contracts.) A new era of 
constraint and regulation is upon us, and Congress has begun to reinvest 
in the acquisition workforce for the first time in two decades. Analogous 
stories played out in prior generations.
Parallel to this saga, a new pendulum has begun to swing: outsource-
insource. In past years we have noted that the government’s bipartisan 
outsourcing (or, at times, “competitive sourcing”) initiative had spanned 
more than fifteen years (and two two-term administrations), yet, last year, 
it seemed that insourcing was all the rage. The latest trend focused on 
“rebalancing” the federal and contractor workforces as a key element of 
overall acquisition reform. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Policy Letter, Work 
Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees (March 31, 
April 19, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procure-
ment_index_work_performance; Ralph C. Nash, Contracting-Out Policy: 
Guidance From The Office Of Federal Procurement Policy, 24 N&CR 
¶ 23 (“The most interesting aspect of this guidance is the functions that 
are missing from the illustrations in spite of the fact that many agencies 
have had these functions performed by contractors.”) To the extent that 
we have been consistently unpersuaded by much of the insourcing rheto-
ric and have fretted that much of the insourcing activity (particularly at 
DoD) is quota-driven rather than results-oriented, we are slightly more 
sanguine this year. See generally CWC Probes Inherently Governmental 
Functions, PSC Oversight, 52 GC ¶ 219; Industry Suggests Changes to 
Proposed Guidance on Inherently Governmental Functions, 52 GC ¶ 195; E. 
Sanderson Hoe & Phillip Carter, Feature Comment: OFPP Issues Proposed 
New Definition of ‘Inherently Governmental,’ 52 GC ¶ 139; OFPP Seeks 
Comments on Inherently Governmental Functions Guidance, 52 GC ¶ 126; 
Ralph C. Nash, Contractors That “Closely Support Inherently Governmental 
Functions”: They’ve Grown Like Topsy, 24 N&CR ¶ 8 (“Trying to develop 
a competent Government workforce to award and manage contractors 
that closely support inherently governmental functions may be a sound 
short-term goal but it is poor long-term strategy. It makes … more sense 
to develop a competent Government workforce to perform those functions 
that closely support inherently governmental functions.”).
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No matter how the pendulum swings, the government faces enormous 
challenges managing its service contracts. See also Vernon J. Edwards, 
Contracting for Services: Challenges For The Next Generation, 24 N&CR 
¶ 59 (“Services confront acquisition personnel with many challenges with 
which our experience in the acquisition of supplies has not prepared us 
to cope …. It seems unlikely that in the current economic and political 
climate the Government is going to significantly reduce its reliance on 
contractor services in the near term. Thus, the problem must be man-
aged.”); Vernon J. Edwards, “Tradecraft” in Services Acquisition: DoD’s 
New Policies, 24 N&CR ¶ 55 (“While we think that the USD AT&L memo 
proposes to do some good things, the road to better services acquisition 
does not run through policy. While policy is necessary, it does not solve 
problems. People solve problems—people with know-how and skill. The 
DOD memo focuses on procedures, making only a passing, one-sentence 
allusion to the need for a more competent workforce.”)
A. Understanding The outsourced industrial Base for Services. 
Despite its increased significance to the government’s ability to function, 
the government consistently appears to lack accurate insight into the 
extent and nature of its reliance on the private sector. One of our recent 
reports sheds light on this topic. Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Structure and Dynamics of 
the U.S. Federal Professional Services Industrial Base 1995–2009, avail-
able at http://csis.org/files/publication/101112_fps_report_2010.pdf. 
The report details, with extensive macro- and micro-level analysis, how 
the government has grown into its permanent and growing reliance on 
contracts for a wide range of professional and support services. Over the 
fifteen-year period 1995–2009, the professional services industry expanded 
at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.2 percent per year, from 
$137 billion in 1995, to $280 billion in 2009. Professional, administrative, 
and management services (PAMS) represented by far the largest segment 
within the federal professional services industry, accounting for $93.6 bil-
lion worth of contracts in 2009, up from only $27.4 billion in 1995.
During the same period, indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs) experi-
enced a remarkable 13.3 percent CAGR and, since 2006, accounted for a 
majority of all professional service contract dollars. From 2005 through 
2009, multiple-award indefinite delivery contracts (IDCs or ID/IQ’s) have 
become a favored form of IDVs; they now annually distribute $47.1 billion 
of contract funding, compared with only $1.9 billion in 1995. Multiple-
award IDC growth remained robust in the last five years, achieving a 16.8 
percent CAGR for contract value and a 13.6 percent CAGR for number 
of contract actions.
The report identifies sustained areas of concern in service contracting:
•	 inadequate	contract	oversight,
•	 difficulties	with	the	formulation	of	requirements,
•	 the	usage	of	suitable	contract	vehicles,
•	 workforce	issues—for	contract	surveillance	in	particular,
•	 lack	of	visibility	and	effective	metrics	for	performance	assess-
ments,
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•	 insufficient	strategic	leadership	and	independent	management	
reviews,
•	 lack	of	risk	assessments	for	contractors	closely	supporting	inher-
ently governmental functions, and
•	 fragmented	organizational	structures	supporting	services	con-
tracting.
Unfortunately, important policy issues regarding the U.S. professional 
services industrial base cannot be resolved due to lack of data. Specifi-
cally, as noted above, FPDS presents a substantial obstacle; it contains no 
data on contract performance despite the fact that acquisition regulations 
already mandate collection of contract performance data.
B. Another nail in The “Personal Services Prohibition” Cof-
fin? One intriguing, yet little-known trend we confronted this year is 
that contractor employees are more frequently suing the Government, 
alleging employment discrimination on the part of Government managers, 
supervisors, or even coworkers. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. 
Swan, Feature Comment: Suing The Government As A ‘Joint Employee’-
-Evolving Pathologies Of The Blended Workforce, 52 GC ¶ 341 (October 
20, 2010). At some level, this should not surprise us, as the government’s 
increased reliance on employee-augmentation contracts has blurred the 
distinction between contractor employees and civil servants throughout 
the government workspace. Across the government, it is increasingly com-
mon to find contractor personnel and civil servants working in the same 
offices and, all too often, performing the same or similar functions. And 
the federal courts’ and the EEOC’s willingness to define federal agen-
cies as de facto employers of contractor employees seems to offer further 
evidence that the prohibition on personal service contracts is—or should 
now be deemed—a dead letter.
Moreover, our sense is that most Government managers and contract-
ing professionals have not fully recognized their potential liability as 
a so-called “joint employer” of contractor personnel. Many a frustrated 
Government manager has favored outsourcing because it is easier for 
managers to jettison individual contractor employees, for whatever reason, 
than to terminate or reassign civil servants. Apparently, however, it seems 
increasingly likely that a contractor employee’s denial of a preferred as-
signment or an employment opportunity today could spur a discrimination 
claim against the agency.
Vi. inFoRMATion TeCHnoLoGY: A neW APPRoACH?
[D]espite spending more than $600 billion on [IT] over the 
past decade, the Federal Government has achieved little of the 
productivity improvements that private industry has realized 
from IT. Too often, Federal IT projects run over budget, behind 
schedule, or fail to deliver promised functionality. Many projects 
use “grand design” approaches that aim to deliver functionality 
every few years, rather than breaking projects into more 
manageable chunks and demanding new functionality every few 
quarters. In addition, the Federal Government too often relies 
on large, custom, proprietary systems when “light technologies” 
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or shared services exist. Government officials have been trying 
to adopt best practices for years .... But obstacles have always 
gotten in the way.
Vivek Kundra, U.S. Chief Information Officer, 25 Point Implementation 
Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology Management (December 
9, 2010), available at http://cio.gov/documents/25-Point-Implementation-
Plan-to-Reform-Federal%20IT.pdf; see also Administration Issues IT Pro-
curement Strategy, 52 GC ¶ 391. This has the makings of an ambitious 
reform agenda:
[H]ighlights of the implementation plan include:
•	 Turnaround	or	terminate	at	least	one-third	of	underperforming	
projects in IT portfolio within the next 18 months
•	 Shift	to	“Cloud	First”	policy….
•	 Reduce	number	of	Federal	data	centers	by	at	least	800	by	2015
•	 Only	approve	funding	of	major	IT	programs	that:
- Have a dedicated program manager and a fully staffed inte-
grated program team
- Use a modular approach with usable functionality delivered 
every six months
- Use specialized IT acquisition professionals
•	 Work	with	Congress	to:
- Consolidate commodity IT funding under the Agency CIOs 
and
- Develop flexible budget models that align with modular de-
velopment
•	 Launch	an	interactive	platform	for	pre-RFP	agency-industry	col-
laboration
It is encouraging to hear that OMB, in this context, seems to have 
embraced some of the lessons learned from the government’s failure to 
adequately invest in the acquisition workforce. “Effective IT acquisition 
requires a combination of thorough knowledge of the Federal acquisition 
system, including the tools available, a deep understanding of the dynamic 
commercial IT marketplace, and the unique challenges inherent to suc-
cessfully delivering large IT programs in a modular time-boxed manner.” 
Accordingly, OFPP and the Federal CIO “will design a specialized IT ac-
quisition cadre.” OFPP also will “develop guidance on requirements for IT 
acquisition specialists ... [and] develop guidance on curriculum standards 
to cross-train program managers and IT acquisition professionals.” Also 
watch for contract vehicles for cloud-based Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
(Iaas) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) solutions. Overall, it is an opti-
mistic and far-reaching agenda. Strong promises have been made:
Federal IT projects will no longer last multiple years without 
delivering meaningful functionality. Poorly performing projects 
will be identified early and put under a spotlight for turnaround 
– those that continue to flounder will be terminated. No longer 
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will large IT contracts be negotiated by individuals without IT 
expertise. No longer will one agency build expensive new data 
centers when other agencies have excess capacity. And no longer 
will rigid budgeting constraints prevent executives from making 
smart decisions with taxpayer dollars; flexible models will allow 
agency leaders to shift funds where and when they are needed, 
ensuring that results matter more than plans.
Despite this soaring, all-encompassing prose, it remains unclear whether 
OMB achieved buy-in from the government’s large and diverse IT com-
munity. On the same day that OMB launched its twenty-five-point plan, 
DoD released its Section 804 Report, A New Approach for Delivering Infor-
mation Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense (November 
2010), available at https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy_Documents/
Attachments/3255/OSD13744-10-804ReportToCongress.pdf. 
The DoD is developing a comprehensive new process to acquire 
and deliver IT capabilities. This process will leverage ongoing 
Department efforts to streamline Defense Business Systems 
(DBS) acquisition and incorporate best practices garnered from 
engagement with industry and lessons learned from ongoing 
DoD efforts. The new process is intended to take full advantage 
of the speed of IT innovation from commercial industry to foster 
an environment for mission-focused and time-critical deliveries 
that support the full spectrum of IT applications within the 
DoD. Significant and fundamental change … is envisioned to not 
only improve the IT acquisition cycle time but also to realize the 
advantages inherent within the operations and maintenance 
of IT products and services. Requirements, resourcing, and 
acquisition management will be synchronized and streamlined 
with risk-scaled oversight through frequent in-process reviews 
and milestone decision points. IT will be acquired as “time-
boxed” projects delivering capability in an iterative fashion 
using mature technologies, while managed in capability-aligned 
portfolios to identify and eliminate redundancy. The new IT 
acquisition process will apply across the DoD information 
enterprise, delivering effective IT to our front line warfighters 
and enabling more efficient business operations. 
Guiding Principles:
•	 Deliver	Early	and	Often.	
•	 Incremental	and	Iterative	Development	and	Testing.	
•	 Rationalized	Requirements.	
•	 Flexible/Tailored	Processes.	
•	 Knowledgeable	and	Experienced	IT	Workforce.
Vii. QUAnTiFYinG THe ToXiC enViRonMenT?
We remain concerned that, all too often, for political purposes, the 
public is not exposed to an objective, even-handed assessment of the roles 
contractors play and the extent of their contribution to the government’s 
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myriad missions. In large part, however, much of the worst anti-contractor 
rhetoric has been toned down, particularly from the White House. We 
credit OFPP Administrator Dan Gordon’s steady leadership and balanced 
approach for this positive trend.
Nonetheless, we remain wary that if contractors are unnecessarily 
vilified, resources will be shifted from pursuing value-based outcomes 
to creating compliance and risk avoidance regimes, which would be an 
inefficient over-reaction. The United States enjoys one of the world’s best 
public procurement regimes. Government customers enjoy excellent value 
for taxpayer money. Contractors provide extraordinary levels of support, 
particularly in extreme conditions such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
does not mean there is no room for improvement. But optimizing return 
on investment entails a different approach from many of the initiatives 
we see, particularly from Congress. As discussed below, we are not alone 
in this belief.
A. The Great Divide? Last year, we conceded that a casual observer 
could be forgiven for concluding that procurement policy today is being 
driven primarily by the inspector general and audit community. Accord-
ingly, we were intrigued by the Professional Services Council Acquisition 
Policy Survey, The Great Divide (October 2010), available at http://www.
pscouncil.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ProcurementPo-
licySurvey/2010_Acquisition_Policy_Survey.pdf. The survey and report 
chronicled the marked difference in the answers of operational acquisition 
professionals – the people who actually purchase the goods and services 
necessary for the government to perform its missions – and those whose 
role is primarily oversight (e.g., legislative staff, GAO, etc.) of the people 
and firms that do the work. The survey reveals a widening chasm between 
the trajectory of acquisition policy and what government acquisition pro-
fessionals believe will add value to the mission of the government. Many 
of the results offer stark contrasts. For example,
•	 Eighty-six	percent	of	all	interviewees	said	that	more	resources	
are going to oversight activities than to contract administration 
[and, to be clear, we find that outcome both frustrating and inef-
ficient];
•	 The	operational	community	voiced	concern	that	the	push	for	
transparency is
- going too far and
- requiring labor-intensive reporting with no clear value analysis;
•	 The	acquisition	community	is	still	feeling	the	effects	of	the	ar-
bitrary [personnel] reductions made in the 1990s, but too often, 
laws are passed or regulations are issued without regard to 
agencies’ ability to implement them and with little concern for 
potential unintended consequences;
•	 Two-thirds	of	all	interviewees	said	the	guidance	from	the	Office	
of Management and Budget (OMB)—much of it based on legis-
lative mandates—was neither clear nor actionable, and eighty 
percent said they did not have the resources to implement the 
guidance;
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•	 Seventy	percent	of	all	interviewees	said	that	OMB’s	proposed	
guidance on defining inherently governmental functions would 
not change the way agencies contracted for services;
•	 With	regard	to	the	administration’s	push	to	award	more	fixed-
price contracts and less cost-reimbursement (and specifically, 
less time-and-materials) contracts
- in 2008: sixty percent speculated that the restrictions would 
not improve contracting outcomes
- in 2010: seventy-one percent said that these mandates, in-
deed, have not resulted in better outcomes (whereas twelve 
percent saw at least some benefit);
•	 Seventy-two	percent	of	the	operational	professionals	described	
the current structure regarding organizational conflicts of inter-
ests as effective, while sixty percent of oversight professionals 
found it ineffective; 
•	 Operational	professionals	graded	the	capacity	of	agencies	to	mit-
igate conflicts as 4.4 out of 5; oversight professionals rated that 
capacity as 1.8 out of 5;
•	 More	than	ninety	percent	of	the	operational	professionals	de-
scribed the current structure regarding personal conflicts of in-
terests as effective, while eighty percent of oversight professional 
found it ineffective; 
PSC’s report concluded that, as compliance regimes increase, business 
judgment (on the part of government acquisition professionals) is de-
emphasized. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the survey respondents 
believe this is precisely the wrong direction. Moreover, operational respon-
dents feel that oversight is based on compliance with sometimes irrelevant 
rules, when it should be based on whether the right capability or outcome 
was delivered through an appropriately awarded and managed contract.
B. Applying Government Personal Conflict of interest Rules to 
Contractor Personnel? In 2010, Congress re-established the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States (ACUS), “an independent federal 
agency dedicated to improving the administrative process through con-
sensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan expert advice and 
recommendations for improvement of federal agency procedures.” http://
www.acus.gov/about/. One of ACUS’ first projects involves “Government 
Contractor Ethics.” http://www.acus.gov/research/the-conference-current-
projects/government-contractor-ethics/. 
The Conference believes that certain important aspects of the 
ethics rules applicable to government employees should be 
extended to contractor employees in order to increase public 
confidence in the government’s acquisition system. This should 
be done in a manner that is cost effective, takes into account the 
disparate needs of the various agencies that utilize independent 
contractors, and is sensitive to the burdens that extension of 
the ethics system to contractor employees would impose on 
agencies and the companies and small businesses with which 
they contract.
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ACUS is considering two options:
Option 1: The Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) Council 
should consider drafting a mandatory FAR clause that would 
adopt … standards … as a minimum set of ethical rules applicable 
to service contractors and contractor employees who do business 
with all agencies covered by the FAR system. The FAR clause 
should [(a)] require that each contractor implement internal 
mechanisms to train employees …, to protect against violations 
of the rules, and to mitigate any violations that occur …;  
[(b)] provide that the contracting agency may terminate the 
contract for material breach of the ethical standards … and 
hold the contractor liable for any damages…; [(c) authorize the] 
contracting agency … to suspend or bar contractors from further 
contracting based on past violations. 
Option 2: Each executive agency should identify the ethical 
risks that confront its contractors and contractor employees ….  
[E]ach agency should then determine whether adopting 
ethical rules regulating those risks would be cost-effective 
and, if so, what ethical standards the rules should impose on 
contractors and contractor employees …. [T]he agency should 
consider whether to adopt rules by a rulemaking process or 
instead to impose rules on a contract-by-contract basis through 
appropriate clauses integrated into individual contracts ….  
[E]ach agency should determine the appropriate consequences 
for violation of its rules.
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/12/COA-
Draft-Recommendation-POSTED-ON-WEB.pdf. ACUS’ first call for public 
comments on this issue generated, basically, no substantive responses 
whatsoever. This suggests that the acquisition community is not yet cog-
nizant of this potentially important policy initiative.
C. organizational Conflicts of interest. As 2010 was ending, DoD 
issued a final rule on organizational conflicts of interest in major defense 
acquisition programs, pursuant to the WASRA. See Final Rule, Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Organizational Conflicts 
of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 75. Fed. Reg. 81908, 
available at http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-12-29/
pdf/2010-32713.pdf. The prefatory language clarifies that: “because the 
FAR proposed rule has not yet been published, and because the decision 
has been made to limit this rule to implementation of OCIs in [major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs)], this final rule has been located 
primarily in [DFARS] subpart 209.5, until such time as the FAR coverage 
on OCIs may be relocated[.]” Last year, we wondered whether Northrop 
Grumman’s sale of TASC, a government consulting division, to comply with 
the WSARA’s new organizational conflict of interest (OCI) requirements 
was an isolated incident or a harbinger. In retrospect, it did not signal 
an opening of a floodgate. It seems unlikely that the new DoD rule, with 
the OFPP initiative pending, will dramatically change the short-term 
landscape.
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See also Ralph C. Nash, Postscript V: Organizational Conflicts of In-
terest, 24 N&CR ¶ 39 (“the rule that the GAO has established is that an 
agency can award a contract containing an OCI and negotiate a mitiga-
tion plan at its leisure. This flies in the face of sound policy that should 
require an acceptable mitigation plan before award of the contract—or at 
least in a very timely manner following a protest ruling that the plan in 
unacceptable. Otherwise, the Government can be faced with a long period 
of performance in the face of an OCI[.]”(emphasis added)); Postscript IV: 
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 24 N&CR ¶ 25.
D. An Update: Transparency into Contractor Fatalities and in-
juries. We previously have expressed frustration that contractor fatalities 
(and injuries) remained generally outside the public’s consciousness. This 
seems particularly significant now that, as of the summer of 2010, more 
than 2,000 contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among other 
things, we believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness 
of the human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A 
significant body of research suggests that the public is at least somewhat 
sensitive to military casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts, 
if any, derive from a significant substitution of contractor fatalities.
We have applauded the government’s efforts, particularly at GAO, to 
do a better job of both keeping track of and reporting these losses. Not 
long ago, the only way to obtain any of this data was through a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Why 
Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38 Parameters 78 (Autumn 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303022. Last year, we commended the La-
bor Department for a giant step towards transparency for posting on the 
Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed under the Defense 
Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act, which make contrac-
tor employees eligible for worker’s compensation benefits pursuant to the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See generally www.
dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. Alas, the trend line was extremely 
disturbing. The publicly available data showed steady annual increases in 
contractor deaths as military deaths declined. Specifically, the data showed 
a dramatic increase starting in Iraq in 2007, and in Afghanistan in 2009. 
Of particular concern was that, according to the Labor Department data, 
contractor deaths in Iraq in 2009 and 2010 actually surpassed military 
deaths; similarly, the data indicates that in the first half of 2010, more 
contractors died in Afghanistan than U.S. soldiers. See, e.g., Steven L. 
Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, service 
contractor (September 2010), available at http://www.pscouncil.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ServiceContractorMagazine/
SC_SEPT2010_Web.pdf. 
We now understand that, based upon GAO’s recent work, we need to 
revisit this data. As we expected, the contractor fatality figures may be 
significantly higher than the data previously suggested. See generally 
GAO-11-1, Iraq & Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued 
Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated 
Personnel (October 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-11-1; Overseas Contract Tracking Still Faces Challenges, GAO Finds, 
9-16
© 2011 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
52 GC ¶ 333 (“SPOT [the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 
Tracker] ‘still cannot reliably track information on contracts, assistance 
instruments, and associated personnel,’ GAO said.”). The Labor Depart-
ment “explained that injuries to local and third country contractors, in 
particular, may be underreported.” In addition, GAO acknowledged that 
it “could not verify whether State’s and USAID’s data were complete … 
[and] a recent report from the USAID Inspector General suggested that not 
all security contractors in Afghanistan are reporting incidents that result 
in personnel being injured or killed.” DoD continues to lack “a reliable 
system for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel[,]” but DoD 
“eventually intend[s] to track the number of killed and wounded contrac-
tor personnel through SPOT.” Moreover: “A DOD official in Afghanistan 
knowledgeable on the matter cautioned though that the reports most 
likely understate the actual number of contractor casualties, as not all 
contractors submit reports as required.” Finally, it may be impossible for 
the public to chronicle these fatalities with temporal accuracy because 
“Labor’s Web site provides data on DBA cases by the date that each case 
was created, which is not always the date that the incident occurred.” 
Viii. A LonG, LonG TiMe AGo. 
It seems fitting to conclude this discussion of emerging issues with at 
least a passing reference to the A-12 litigation. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
& General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. The U.S Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit described this litigation as the American version of 
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the fictional court case in the Charles Dickens 
novel bleak house. (“This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become 
so complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”) The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari (in McDonnell Douglas, not Jaryndyce) for the 
purpose of reviewing to what extent the government’s invocation of the 
state secrets privilege may have impacted the outcome of this long-running 
litigation. Now, “final resolution … may well turn on the complicated and 
little explored interplay between the Government’s right to protect highly 
sensitive information [in] dispute resolution on contracts involving that 
information.” Neil H. O’Donnell and Dennis J. Callahan, Feature Com-
ment: The A-12 Saga Continues, 52 GC ¶ 388. Experience suggests that 
the Supreme Court will not involve itself with the nuances of a govern-
ment contract dispute, but nothing is certain. More dramatically, however, 
this stage of appellate review guarantees that this long-running dispute 
will survive into its twentieth year. Ask yourself: Where were you in the 
winter of 1990/1991, when the Navy terminated the contract? How about 
in June of 1991, when the contractors filed their lawsuit in the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims? It is hard not to be cynical about an acquisition regime 
and a judicial system that keeps this story unfolding.
9-17
